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This  paper  examines  the relations  between  ﬁnancing  institutions  and  more  local  ownership  structures
for  energy  provision.  This  research  deﬁnes  municipal  and  civil  society  structures  involved  in  energy
provision  as the  ‘Civic  Energy  Sector’.  It  argues  that  the  ﬁnancial  institutions  of nations  are key  enabling
institutions  for  this  sector  to contribute  to a low  carbon  energy  transition.  The  path  of  development  of
these  ﬁnancial  institutions  helps  to shape  the  ownership  structures  and  technology  choices  of  energy
systems  and  futures  in different  nations.  This  paper  presents  ﬁndings  from  case analysis  comparing  the
United  Kingdom’s  latent  civic  energy  sector,  with  the  expansion  of this  sector  in  Germany.  Using  annstitutional economics
nergy transitions
nergy ownership
institutional  economics  framing,  the  paper  demonstrates  the  importance  of the  German  local  banking
sector  in facilitating  civic  ownership  structures  in  that  country.  In contrast,  the  neo-liberal,  market-led
ﬁnancial  institutions  in  the UK,  reinforce  energy  pathways  less  reliant  on  civic ownership  models.  Hence,
the forms  of  low  carbon  energy  transition  being  pursued  in  these  countries  are  constrained  by path
s  bot
ublisdependence  of institution
© 2015  The  Authors.  P
. Introduction
This paper explores the concept of a ‘civic’ energy sector, com-
rising citizen, community, co-operative and municipal ownership
f energy systems. The authors argue this is a useful classiﬁcation
or examining the role of institutions beyond the market and state
n energy transitions. The authors explore the relations between
hese civic ownership structures and institutions of banking and
nance, arguing that the macro ﬁnancial institutions of nations are
ey enablers in energy transitions. It is increasingly important to
nderstand how ﬁnancial institutions can enable civic energy par-
icipation, and how these interact with regulatory institutions, such
s feed in tariff laws or portfolio standards, to constrain or incen-
ivise different ownership forms. As such it is useful to conceive
f a ‘civic energy sector’ as consisting of both ‘community’ energy
chemes and municipal business models in generation, distribu-
ion, supply, and examine their enabling ﬁnancial institutions.
Previous research has examined the effects of different gov-
rnance and institutional framings on national energy system
ransitions [1,12]. However, as these system transitions are largely
ountry-speciﬁc, this paper adopts a comparative case study of the
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: stevehallrise@gmail.com (S. Hall).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2015.11.004
214-6296/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article uh  within  and  beyond  the  energy  sector.
hed  by  Elsevier  Ltd.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under the  CC  BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
emerging civic energy sectors in the UK, and Germany. Understand-
ing the enabling role of ﬁnancial institutions has wider signiﬁcance
for assessing the potential for civic energy sectors in other nations
to play a substantive role in achieving transitions to secure, afford-
able and low carbon energy systems.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 establishes the
concept of a civic energy sector and highlights a gap in the litera-
ture on the role of institutions of ﬁnance in energy systems change.
Section 3 describes the comparative case methodology. Section 4
presents empirical results on the participation of civic forms in the
UK and Germany, and the effect of ﬁnancial institutions on the
deployment of renewable energies. Section 5 discusses how the
contrasting emergence of a civic energy sector in these two  coun-
tries has been shaped by their respective ﬁnancial institutions and
linked social and cultural values. Section 6 concludes the analysis
and proposes further research questions.
2. The concept of a civic energy sector and the role of
ﬁnancial institutions
2.1. Community and municipal energyMuch work exploring civil society participation in the energy
sector has focussed on community-led energy projects. These treat-
ments often analyse the internal dynamics of organisations as
nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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pposed to taking a systemic perspective. Research has tended to
ocus on community generation [2–4] or investigate group forma-
ion, policy suitability and barriers to entry [5–8]. In parallel to the
ommunity energy debate, there is a growing understanding that
he municipal level can be a key actor in energy transitions [9–11],
articularly in a decentralised future [12,13]. However, research
nto municipal institutions in the energy sector has also tended
owards analysis of their internal workings; or the alignment of
institutions, techniques and artefacts’ that bring urban actors into
he energy space [14]. This is useful in understanding the insti-
utional dynamics within the sector, but more needs to be done
o understand the role of wider institutional context[s] on com-
unity and municipal ownership forms [15,16]. What has been
issing is an investigation of the enabling institutions of civic and
ivil participation beyond the energy sector, and their impact on
nergy systems. This paper focusses on the interplay of ﬁnancial
nstitutions and civic ownership structures.
.2. Exploring a ‘civic’ framing
To explore the effect of enabling institutions on the non-state
on-corporate ownership models in the energy sector, a broad def-
nition is needed. We  adopt the term ‘civic’ because civil society
nd the civic sphere have often been proposed as a third element
f contemporary society, beyond market and state. Civil society can
rovide goods and services in a way which claims to both transcend
he bureaucracy and ideologies of state forms of welfare and service
rovision, and ameliorate the amorality of pure market approaches
17,18]. However, whereas civil society refers to a community of
itizens linked by common interests and collective activity, ‘civic’
s deﬁned as relating to a city or town, especially its administration
the municipal). Whereas civil society can be a-territorial, ‘civic’ has
 particular geography and incorporates the local state or munici-
ality. Municipalities are often classiﬁed as part of the public sector,
 ‘state’ form. However the unproblematic adoption of the munic-
pal level as a pure ‘state’ form does not capture the agency of a
unicipality beyond the strategies imposed upon it by higher lev-
ls of the state [38]. Whilst we do not argue for an incorporation of
he municipal into civil society, we do argue that the ‘civic’ fram-
ng is a useful moniker for investigating the interplay of values,
nstitutional form and energy system change.
.3. Institutions as enabling agents
The ﬁnancial institutions of a country are often characterised
s either bank or market-based [19]. In national economies with
 more [neo]-liberal political economy as in the UK, ‘market
ased’ ﬁnance is drawn from capital markets via equity or debt
nstruments traded in liquid securities. “In co-ordinated market
conomies such as Germany and Japan, banks play a much more
mportant role in the long-term ﬁnancing of companies as part
f a broader ‘corporatist’ industrial structure” [20]. Following the
arieties of Capitalism School, this national [ﬁnancial] institutional
ontext affects the ability of economies to deploy ﬁnance to either
xed capital formation and lending to the ‘real economy’ [20].
s decentralised energy systems are a particularly visible form of
xed capital formation, one would expect institutional analysis of
nance to form a greater part of energy systems research. How-
ver much energy research on ﬁnancial ‘institutions’ focusses on
he micro-economic institutions of market making tools and sup-
ort regimes such as renewable energy subsidies [21], emissions
rading mechanisms [22] and carbon pricing [23]. This has proven
 rich ground of analysis for neo-classical and political/institutional
conomists alike. However, much less attention has been paid to
ow the institutional context beyond the energy sector affects howcial Science 12 (2016) 5–15
each of these mechanisms play out (though see [24,25]) particularly
at the local scale.
Sovacool [26] calls for more attention to energy institutions
and the governance forms they produce. There is no uncontested
deﬁnition of an ‘institution’ due to a divergence between origi-
nal and neo-institutional economics [27]. We  begin with Foxon’s
[28] deﬁnition; institutions are ‘ways of structuring human inter-
actions’. Here institutions are “the rules of the game”, which
can include regulatory frameworks, property rights and standard
modes of business organisation. Neo-institutional approaches con-
ceive of formal and informal institutions placing constraints on
human behaviour. Formal institutions are codiﬁed rules, legisla-
tion etc enforced by courts; with informal institutions comprising
behavioural norms, enforced at the individual level through peer
groups etc. For an example of formal institutions in the energy
ﬁeld see Aalto [29] who deﬁnes three types of formal institutions in
energy governance (regulations and rules, actor organisations, and
actor agents).
The ‘original’ institutional economics tradition views the for-
mal/informal distinction, and its framing of institutions as pure
constraints on human behaviour, as insufﬁcient [30]. The origi-
nal institutionalists, following Veblen [31], understand the role
of institutions as enablers of speciﬁc action, and shapers of indi-
vidual preference. This approach pays more attention to social
rules systems, and how some institutions rely on others for legiti-
macy. Hall and Taylor [32] describe how the institutions of a given
nation or region can lead to ‘path dependency’,—the idea that the
history of institutional development through space and time mat-
ters. For an energy example, see Toke et al [62]. who analyse
the institutional factors beyond renewable energy price supports
and geographic resource that lead to different rates of deploy-
ment of wind energy across four nations. For Provance et al. [33],
renewable energy deployments are affected by socio-institutional
forces such as cultural norms, values, and behaviours, which are
adopted by organisations to constrain some behaviours but enable
others. Institutions then, include the codiﬁed rules of formal insti-
tutions, informal behavioural norms and the layering of institutions
through time which can lead to path dependency and lock in
[28,34]. One must pay attention to formal institutions in structur-
ing market interactions, and the social construction of institutions,
historic contingency, and the complex interplay of shared values
across institutional worlds. Much civil society activity relies on
some form of shared norms and values, which are critical pre-
conditions for community energy and institutional management
of other resources [2,35,36]: “As manifestations of shared values,
institutions inﬂuence agents’ preferences, choices, and actions as
well as aggregate economic and environmental outcomes” ([37] p.
360).
Original institutionalism opens the study of institutions to a
wider political economy. Nation states, despite ongoing processes
of reorganization, have an enduring power to mould the institu-
tional environments of given sectors [30]. This raises the question
of not only how the state moulds institutional environments, but
also for whom.  In deﬁning the state as strategically selective, Jessop
[38] describes how in built biases of state structures make them
more accessible to some groups and interests than others. Original
institutional economists argue that a nation’s territorial political
economy profoundly affects the spatial composition of ﬁnancial
institutions, which in turn affects the likelihood of these institu-
tions to lend into local/regional organisations in the ‘real’ economy
[39,40]. As Mitchell [41] and Smith demonstrate; the political econ-
omy  of different nation states permeate into the institutions of
energy system transitions. As such there are links between national
political economy, the geography and activity of ﬁnancial institu-
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ions and energy systems change, which have not received enough
ttention from energy scholars.
.4. The role of ﬁnancial institutions in enabling energy system
hange
The relation of civil society institutions to renewable energy
evelopment is well reported in the Danish experience [43–45].
owever these studies deal with institutional landscapes more
roadly, including ﬁnance as an important agent, but not centralis-
ng ﬁnancial institutions as a unit of analysis. Recent contributions
ave analysed the effects of territorial devolution on the insti-
utional support for renewable energy in the UK which ﬁnd
he institutional landscape in the UK systemically favours major
rojects and large corporations [46,61], and cites a lack of com-
atible ﬁnancial institutions in the banking sector, as a barrier
o civic energy in the UK [47,59] but little work has been done
o ﬂesh out the relation to the overall institutional structure of
K banking and ﬁnance. In Germany there has been some more
xplicit analysis of the role of ﬁnancial institutions in civic energy
48,49]. Yildiz et al. [50] highlight claims that German co-operative
nancing structures ‘provide the institutional framework to involve
itizens with political, social, and ﬁnancial aspects of renewable
nergy deployment’, but focus their analysis on internal dynam-
cs of co-operatives. Whilst this work brieﬂy acknowledges the
ole of local and co-operative banks in enabling the debt ele-
ent of citizen ﬁnance participation, they remain unanalysed
s a causal factor in growing citizen investment in renewable
nergies. Yildiz [49] calls for an analysis of how institutional
ackgrounds of these actors ‘not only give insight on how exist-
ng ﬁnancial institutions and instruments complement the equity
aised by citizens, but also help to develop measures and a frame-
ork to further promote investments of citizens in renewable
nergy’.
Two research questions follow; what role does the macro insti-
utional context of the ﬁnance and banking sector in each nation
lay in enabling different technologies and organisational struc-
ures to proliferate? And to what degree are civic energy futures
ependent on the way ﬁnancial institutions respond to strategic
ctions of the state?
. Methods: comparative case study of Germany and the UK
An international comparative study of the emerging civic energy
ectors in Germany and the UK was undertaken. Sovacool [26] calls
or comparative approaches when studying energy society interac-
ions as they can increase the robustness and applicability of case
esults. Aalto [29] recognises the value of case oriented compara-
ive method in studying energy institutions. We  select the UK and
ermany here, due to four elements which suggest institutional
istories and path dependence will be particularly instructive.
irstly, whilst both countries are committed to low-carbon energy
utures, the macro framing of these transitions differs signiﬁcantly.
n the UK, this is framed in terms of state creation of ‘competitive’
arkets: “the Government will create markets that enable compet-
ng low carbon technologies to win the largest market share” [51];
n Germany, the ‘Energiewende’ transition is seen as involving a
ide range of actors in contributing to achieving an energy systems
hange. Secondly, the different experiences of electricity market
iberalisation. Where the UK’s market liberalisation was imposed
n a nationalised and centralised electricity system, German mar-
et liberalisation took place in the context of a decentralised and
unicipally-led post-war reconstruction [52]. Thirdly, the historic
entralisation of the UK state is in contrast to the decentralised
odel of the German federal system. Finally, as we study ﬁnan-cial Science 12 (2016) 5–15 7
cial institutions, this comparison is important because the UK  and
Germany can be seen at opposite ends of a spectrum of mar-
ket based (neoliberal) compared to bank based (co-ordination)
economies [40]. Both systems are of a similar technical maturity,
ruling out any bias based on development phases. This approach
enabled investigation of the penetration of civic forms of energy
provision where they could reasonably be expected to differ due in
part to variations in ﬁnancial institutions.
This study utilised a qualitative research design consisting of
in-depth semi-structured interviews, and secondary documentary
analysis of policy and statistical publications. Interviewees were
selected that had interests in the ﬁnance, ownership, or gover-
nance of the energy systems in the UK and Germany, focussing on
the electricity sector. Primary data is drawn from in-depth inter-
views with 36 individuals from across the electricity value chain in
the UK and Germany. The interviewees comprised 7 utility exec-
utives (including two  stadtwerke executives), 9 energy ﬁnance
providers (from hedge funds and pensions funds to citizen and co-
operative ﬁnance), 6 project developers, 5 institutional investment
professionals, 2 policy professionals, 2 energy journalists, 2 energy
lobbyists, 2 academics, and 1 municipal energy ofﬁcer.
4. Results: civic sector involvement across the electricity
value chain in the UK and Germany
Drawing on this empirical evidence base, the levels of civic sec-
tor participation in the electricity value chain are presented for
the UK and Germany, and the effect of the institutions of energy
policy/regulation and the structure of the ﬁnancial institutions in
each nation are drawn together to demonstrate how these have
inﬂuenced these levels of civic sector participation.
4.1. The United Kingdom
In the UK, the starting point for a low carbon energy transition
is the current liberalised energy system with highly concentrated
private ownership. Prior to 1945, European electricity systems
were predominantly the remit of local authorities or civic groups
[53,52]. In the UK circa 300 of these organisations were involved
in electricity supply [54]. Wollman et al. [52] ﬁnd the post-war
move to nationalised energy systems in France, Italy and the UK,
a key moment in the centralisation of the energy sector. Pond
describes the Conservative governments of 1979–1997 as leading
an unprecedented liberalisation of the UK energy system, which
beneﬁtted from having a fully nationalised industry to privatise.
4.1.1. Generation
Following UK market liberalisation, electricity generation assets
have been almost exclusively owned by corporate utilities [56–58].
In 2014, there were 32 Major Power Producers, accounting for 82.7%
of installed capacity [57]. Following a series of mergers and entry
of a small number of large international utilities, a ‘Big Ten’ of
generation companies emerged, which includes the ‘Big Six’ ver-
tically integrated utilities, alongside ESB, Drax, GDF  Suez and AES.
In 2012 these ten companies collectively owned 85.8% of UK gen-
eration assets [58]. The remaining 14.2% comprises 64 medium
sized private companies and corporate entities. The ‘Big Six’ utili-
ties own  47% of renewable capacity [57]. Whilst renewable energies
have a less concentrated ownership structure than thermal genera-
tion, beneﬁcial ownership remains predominantly in private hands
(ibid). The community energy sector owns 0.3% of renewable capac-
ity; approximately 60MW [59]. Comparable municipal generation
statistics are unavailable but are unlikely to exceed 1% [9].
The formal institutional support system has been the Renew-
ables Obligation which has been criticised for being too complex,
characterising revenues too uncertain for civil society groups to
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ubstantively engage with [60,61]. Other institutional barriers to
ivil society participation have been the planning system [18,62]
nd infrastructure connection problems [63]. However some of
hese problems can be seen as symptomatic of institutional bar-
iers in the ﬁnancial system. Many objections in the planning
ystem have been linked to a lack of locally beneﬁcial ﬁnancial
nd ownership models being offered by developers [64,65]. Sim-
larly, the complexity of the Renewables Obligation affects the ease
ith which commercial banks can ﬁnance the sector [66], this was
eﬂected by one of our German interviewees:
“I have taken a look into the [UK] regulatory framework a few
years ago, the certiﬁcate system [RO], and as it’s totally different
from the German model, [Landsbank name] decided not to work
in this kind of system, because we are focusing on let’s say the
ﬁxed feed-in tariffs, because it’s obviously easier to do cash ﬂow
calculation based on that.”
(RE Finance provider, GER, 2014)
Whilst larger schemes qualifying for the RO face ﬁnancial com-
lexity, at the sub 5 MW scale, the UK Feed in Tariffs (FiTs) and
enewable Heat Incentive (RHI) for small scale schemes are sim-
ler, and have led to a number of innovative ﬁnancing solutions
hat bridge the gap between institutional capital and aggregated
mall scale Schemes [67], some of this innovation adopts more
rogressive models than others:
“there’s this group of people making a fortune from tax and
investment vehicles, where you’ve got a minimum investment
of 25 K and they are the ones ﬁnancing the free solar type
projects, they’re getting the FiTs off the back of it, its money
for nothing, it really is, risk free, 10–11%. That opportunity is
not opened up in any way to the mass market. . ..Since 2008 the
richest 1% have doubled their wealth where everybody else’s
wealth has declined, if you see some of these investment oppor-
tunities that people with high sums to invest get access to it is
insane”
(Energy ﬁnance provider, UK 2013)
The same respondent added “what we don’t have is the small
edium sized capital markets” which were seen as necessary to
apitalise small to medium renewables schemes. Much of this inno-
ative ﬁnancial practise is due to a lack of compatible ﬁnancial
nstitutions in the UK at the right level to capitalise smaller FiT
chemes [66].
.1.2. Distribution
The privatisation of the UK energy system in the 1990s moved
ransmission and distribution networks to a regulated approach.
ollowing mergers, the 14 regional distribution networks are now
perated by seven corporate groups [68,69]. Distribution networks
orm natural monopolies and in the UK and Germany, operate an
llowable revenues system, regulated by speciﬁc formulae [70,71].
here has been interest expressed by UK municipalities in own-
ng distribution networks [72], but ownership of distribution assets
utside private hands is still rare. There is very little opportunity for
ivic participation in distribution networks, largely because there
s no periodic opportunity to change ownership structure.
.1.3. Supply
In the retail market, the UK is dominated by six suppliers with
5% of domestic and 80% of commercial supply [73]. Efforts to
romote more competition have led to 24 companies offering elec-
ricity and/or gas supply to households and 30 companies offering
lectricity and/or gas supply to commercial consumers [74,75].
hilst the market shares of the big six are falling overall, concerns
emain over the outcomes being secured by households and SMEs.
here are signs of diversiﬁcation, with new entrants including acial Science 12 (2016) 5–15
number of low-carbon energy suppliers, a co-operative supplier,
and a private supplier focussed on promoting community energy.
Whilst still unrealised, there is signiﬁcant interest in achieving
supply market penetration from civil society groups, including bur-
geoning interest in setting up new municipal supply companies
[76]. Several formal institutional barriers to supply market penetra-
tion by civic actors have been identiﬁed [76], including barriers to
supply market participation originating in a lack of ﬁnancial insti-
tutions able to offer the collateral needed to enter the electricity
retail market:
“the size of the money that you need to have stashed away
somehow whether it’s cash or collateral or parent company,
guaranteed or some big brother system beside you at the table
when you’re negotiating these contracts gets to be a jolly big
number [. . .]  about £50m of wholesale energy. So in very crude
terms if you’ve 100,000 customers all renewing for a year on
the same day you need to ﬁnd somehow £50m of collateral to
secure a price quoted on day one. And that is a serious problem
for any energy supplier but it’s also clearly a key problem for
any municipal, well any community energy group.  . .”
(Utility executive, 2015)
Currently there is no ‘parent company’ or ‘big brother system’
with sufﬁcient ﬁnance capital to support new market entrants.
Larger municipal authorities may  be able to source this collateral,
but there are no supportive institutional structures in the ﬁnancial
sector to facilitate this.
4.1.4. The role of ﬁnancial institutions
The UK is the archetype of market based, centralized and
spatially concentrated ﬁnance [39]. Following Verdier [40], this
geographic and market concentration is likely to lead to a fall in ‘real
economy’ lending and affect ﬁxed capital formation [77]. Whilst the
UK does indeed perform poorly on both measures [20,78]. these
data are too broad to unpick how ﬁnancial institutions capitalise
energy generally, and civic energy speciﬁcally.
Blyth et al [79] show that 50% of recent UK generation ﬂeet
ﬁnance has come from debt or equity raised against the assets and
cash ﬂows of corporate utilities. Yet the ability of traditional utilities
to fund requisite levels of renewables deployment is question-
able [79]. This foregrounds the issue of which ﬁnancial institutions
the other 50% has come from, as this sector may  need to expand
capital allocation to energy transitions. The form of these institu-
tions is important, because it affects the types of renewable energy
preferred by investors, the energy business models they prefer to
invest in, and the ﬁnancial vehicles they prefer to invest with [25];
the UK respondents described the non-utility element of capacity
investment:
“Pretty much all wind has been ﬁnanced in two ways: half has
come from the balance sheets of the utility companies and the
other half has come from banks, project ﬁnance from banks”
(Institutional Investment Professional, 2013)
In the UK, relying on utility balance sheet ﬁnance and project
ﬁnance from banks means relying on two centralised and inter-
nationalised sources of private capital. This has had two  effects
on UK energy investment. Firstly the availability of capital for the
UK energy sector is more exposed to volatility in broader ﬁnan-
cial markets, as utility equity and bank debt in market based
systems is closely tied to capital liquidity more generally [20]. Sec-
ondly the ability of multinational and investment capital to lend to
small/medium scale projects is very low, largely due to the liquidity
requirements of market based ﬁnancial systems [25]. Commercial
banks and utilities were very exposed to capital market volatil-
ity during the ﬁnancial crisis, reducing the capital available for
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comprises hundreds of companies with individual installations,
larger corporations with multiple sites and co-operative and citizen
wind parks (Fig. 1).S. Hall et al. / Energy Researc
nergy system investment [79]. As such, recent UK energy policy
the Electricity Market Reform (EMR) package) has been designed
o expand the types of ﬁnancial institutions investing in renew-
bles by attracting the ‘mainstream’ investment community [80],
.e. pension, sovereign wealth, insurance and hedge/private wealth
unds:
“The main way we have to ﬁnance the transition is going to be
through project ﬁnance, but the banks who currently do manage
project ﬁnance aren’t going to be able to do it, so the mainstream
investment community is going to be looked to”
(Institutional Investment professional, 2013 [our emphasis])
The Electricity Market Reform (EMR) package was speciﬁcally
esigned to attract investment from pension fund, insurance fund
nd sovereign wealth funds by adopting a FiT system with contracts
or difference (CfDs) to secure a more stable and predictable rev-
nue stream, thought to be attractive to these ﬁnancial institutions:
“. . .in principle the idea, what EMR  could produce is fundamen-
tally something that could be quite attractive to the UK deﬁned
beneﬁt pension plans if structured in the right way”
(RE Investor, 2013)
However, utility balance sheet ﬁnance, project ﬁnance from
nternational banks, and mainstream investment ﬁnance is unlikely
o capitalise myriad citizen, municipal and co-operative distributed
enewable energy schemes of £20m and below:
“. . .there’s not many banks out there that will loan on small
scale community schemes. You can only talk to the big banks if
you’re borrowing millions of pounds, that’s when they’re really
interested in you.”
(Co-operative energy developer UK, 2013)
In the UK it has been difﬁcult for civil society energy schemes to
ource appropriate levels of ﬁnance; an issue explicitly recognised
n the UK Government’s community energy strategy as a ‘ﬁnance
ap’ for projects where ‘city’ level project ﬁnance does not usually
tart below £20m [59]. This could have been partially addressed
y the UK’s Green Investment Bank, capitalised with £3.8bn public
unds. But the GIB has lent £2bn to date to predominantly indepen-
ent private power provision or larger public sector projects [81].
here are movements toward a smaller scale citizen ﬁnance sec-
or in the UK. Companies such as Abundance and Pure Leapfrog are
ffering citizen ﬁnance debentures for small scale investors. The
ounty of Hampshire is in the process of establishing a commu-
ity bank tasked with delivering a low carbon economy, explicitly
iting the German banking model as key to supporting renewable
nergies [82]. For now however the ﬁnance gap remains real for
he smaller scale energy schemes preferred by civil society groups.
In summary, the distribution and retail elements of the UKs elec-
ricity system incorporates little or no elements of civic ownership.
here new ﬁnancial vehicles have been created by the state, they
ave been in the form of a CfD FiT vehicle structured for the pref-
rences of large investment institutions, or as in the case of small
cale FiTs have been beneﬁcial to investors with signiﬁcant deploy-
ble funds (see [67]). In generation, the institutional constraints of
lanning law, connection charges and a complex subsidy system
re widely recognised. This research adds to this with an under-
tanding that the institutions of a market based ﬁnancial system
nd it very difﬁcult to capitalise small scale renewables, and so
ivil society ownership and civic participation in energy generation
s likely to remain niche without changes to the system of ﬁnancial
nstitutions.cial Science 12 (2016) 5–15 9
4.2. Germany
In Germany, the ‘Energiewende’ transition begins from a
more decentralised ownership base. In West Germany in partic-
ular, there was  no nationalisation of the electricity system and
post-war reconstruction retained existing principals of local self-
government, remaining largely under municipal ownership. The
‘stadtwerke’ (municipally owned utilities) provided the majority of
energy services. European market reforms struggled in the German
energy sector, which remained [largely] under municipal control
until European directives, speciﬁcally 96/92/EC [83], forced monop-
olies to break by introducing the right to switch supplier and
requiring the unbundling of generation, supply and transmission
[84]. This led to a wave of mergers resulting in a ‘big four’ emerg-
ing from the previous eight vertically integrated energy companies
[85]. This posed a challenge to the Stadtwerke which had oper-
ated local or regional integrated monopolies; though many saw this
as an opportunity to invite private capital into their shareholder
structure or divest themselves of energy obligations.
Market liberalisation saw a reduction in Stadtwerke from circa
900–600 [52]. However, there has been a return to municipal
and community ownership of energy infrastructures, referred to
as re-communalisation [86]. This refers to the re-establishment
of stadtwerke but also incorporates other civic ownership struc-
tures, such as co-operatives. The number of Stadtwerke active in
energy has risen to approximately 850 [87]. By 2012, 170 com-
munities had won  back distribution grid concession contracts, 60
new stadtwerke had been formed [86] and the post-liberalisation
dilution of municipal equity in stadtwerke is being reversed [52].
4.2.1. Generation
Installed capacity in 2014 was  196,133 GW and comprised 707
individual power producing companies [88]. There is a lower con-
centration of ownership in thermal generation with the ‘Big Four’
(E.ON, EnBW, RWE  and Vattenfall) owning 33.4% of total generation
capacity (ibid). Stadtwerke own  6% of total installed capacity [89],
where part or all of the beneﬁcial ownership rests with municipal-
ities. 33% of installed capacity is made up of <10 MW installations
supported by the German Feed in Tariff (EEG) with a diverse own-Fig. 1. German installed capacity by ownership 2014.
(Source: Bundesnetzagentur, 2014 [88])
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Whilst conventional generation in Germany incorporates signif-
cant elements of municipal, citizen, co-operative and community
wnership, it is the ownership structures of installed renewable
apacity that vary most markedly from the UK. Ownership of
enewable generation assets is diverse and incorporates multiple
on-corporate, non-state models (Fig. 2).
Industry, Germany’s ‘Big Four’, project ﬁrms, other power
roviders and investment funds/banks account for only 53% of
enewable capacity ownership. The Stadtwerke are classed as
other power producers’. The category “Investment funds and
anks” is heterogeneous and contains institutional investors such
s pensions and insurance funds as in the UK, closed end funds
tructured by specialised issuing houses and funds drawing on high
et worth Individuals. Part of this segment is within this deﬁni-
ion of ‘civic’ energy via the civic institutions of ﬁnance deﬁned in
ection 4.2.4.
For the 35% of renewables under ‘private individuals’ this con-
titutes structures through which energy co-operatives, private
ouseholders and communities develop renewable generation.
GRV estimate that more than 800 new energy cooperatives have
nvested circa 1.3 billion euros in renewable energy projects [90].
he co-operative share has increased to constitute 21% of the 34GW
nstalled capacity under citizen ownership [53].
An important driver of this civic ownership of renewable gener-
tion is the creation and retention of value within local economies:
“We’re really democratising the energy system by allowing
everyone in Germany the opportunity, or giving everyone the
opportunity to participate in the system. And that’s something
that has put the Energiewende at the heart of political priori-
ties.”
(Energy Journalist, 2014)
“So you can feel this entrepreneurship and this regional commu-
nity thing in this kind of business. It is very impressive that there
is millions and millions in investments in the region from the
money of the people into regional projects using regional crafts-
men  etc. I think this is the key story of energy co-operatives in
Germany. It’s more about regional development.”
(Co-operative Banking Group Executive, 2014)
These notions of democratisation, local value retention andegional development as motivators for civic participation in
nergy transitions are present in the UK [76] but there was a sub-
tantially deeper appreciation of renewable energies as constitutivecial Science 12 (2016) 5–15
of citizen empowerment and regional economic development
amongst our German respondents.
Numerous studies highlight the role of the German feed in tariff
system or EEG law as particularly supportive of civic participation
in energy [91,92]. It is clear that the formal institutional structure
of the EEG was  a catalyst for renewables development in Germany.
How this was enabled by German ﬁnancial institutions is the focus
of Section 4.2.4.
4.2.2. Distribution
According to the VKU (association of municipal utilities),
around 60% of distribution concessions in Germany remain with
stadtwerke [94]. Co-operative ownership of distribution infrastruc-
ture does exist through, though new energy co-ops are less engaged
in distribution grid activity [95]. Whilst some re-communalised
concessions are small, there have been large re-municipalisations.
A signiﬁcant example is Hamburg, where in September 2013,
50.9% voted in favour of re-municipalisation and the city has
agreed purchased the grid from Vattenfall for between 495
and 550 million Euros [95]. There are several reasons cited
for re-municipalisation/communalisation trend. Respondents con-
sistently identiﬁed acceleration of renewable penetration and
retention of energy value as key drivers:
“..The clear goal is to accelerate the energy transition and the
ways to operate the grid in terms of supporting the change to
renewable energies [. . .]  another motivation is this empower-
ment idea yes, this is something I have observed in many citizen
driven energy co-ops, the do it yourself philosophy. We  can do
it on our own.”
(Source: Co-operative energy developer, 2014)
Several respondents questioned how the acceleration of grid
investment to integrate renewables could be achieved through
re-communalisation, given that municipal/citizen grid operators
are subject to the same allowable revenues structure as private
grid operators. Some recent studies show the values accruing to
municipalities from grid investments include, but are not limited
to: increased tax bases, employment opportunities, and energy
security [97,98,72]. These studies support the case for grid infras-
tructure to be cross subsidised from revenues outside the regulated
charge structure. Further, municipalities recognising the beneﬁts of
high-quality grid infrastructure within their own territory, are pre-
pared to accept a lower return on the asset base, and stipulate that
retained revenues be re-invested in grid services:
“The main effect [of being municipally owned] is we are not
talking every quarter, every year about results and proﬁts. The
communes [municipalities] are long term oriented, because
they are very much interested in a very good and safe reliant
infrastructure.”
(Stadtwerke executive, 2014)
The re-municipalisation of grid infrastructure is not wholly
unproblematic. Capital cannot be raised through equity issue with-
out diluting municipal control [98]. Also, where municipalities or
co-operatives wish to develop generation capacity, grid infrastruc-
ture has to compete for discretionary capital expenditure [99].
In Germany there is a heterogeneous ownership structure
for electricity distribution assets which is tending towards re-
communalisation. Proponents believe this will accelerate the
energy transition and retain values from energy infrastructures
locally.The German electricity supply market comprises over 1000
companies [101]. This includes approximately 850 stadtwerke
that often only supply customers within their territorial footprint,
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hough larger stadtwerke will supply business customers beyond
heir territory. 60–70 Co-operative utilities were reported as active
n energy supply by two interviewees, but this is unconﬁrmed. An
verage German household is able to choose between 80 electricity
uppliers [101]. Estimates of municipal supply market share range
etween 31% [101] and 46% [102]. The domestic market share of the
ig Four reported by BDEW (2012) was 43.8%, which has declined
n recent years but only from a high of circa 50% [99].
A supplier landscape with a high degree of municipal involve-
ent in the form of Stadtwerke changes the use to which proﬁts
rom electricity supply are put. The VKU state that their members:
“. . .do not primarily pursue private commercial objectives but
are guided by public welfare obligations. In our democratic
system, they operate under local self-administration to serve
“citizen value”, i.e. to meet the needs of the local community.
The type of capital they form and secure is a community-
oriented asset.”
(Resolution of the VKU Executive Committee of 26 February
008, available at [104])
Whereas almost 100% of the dividends from UK electricity sup-
ly companies are distributed via international capital markets, the
roﬁts from stadtwerke, which comprise between a third and a
alf of the electricity supply market, can be used for a number
f social, environmental and economic development goals which
ay  or may  not be energy related. To take an example from a large
ntity, Stadtwerke Köln returned circa 265 Million Euro to the city
n 2011, most of which was derived from energy services [105].
espondents identiﬁed the advantages of being a municipal utility
ather than a corporate utility:
“It is the possibility to make earnings. Before, 100 years ago it
was to cover the needs of inhabitants and now it’s about the
local economy”
(Stadtwerke executive, 2014)
“[City name] was one of the ﬁrst cities in the beginning of the
90s that set up a local climate protection concept in 2006–2007
this was a programmes with measures. This was  decided by the
city council, in 2008 there was a climate alliance with the city
and the Stadtwerke”
(Stadtwerke executive, 2014)
Yet Stadtwerke are diverse organisations. Respondents
escribed a spectrum of those that were supportive of citizen
nergy to those which were ambivalent or hostile due to the
ffect of citizen energy on their business models. These results
o not describe municipal energy companies as universally
ositive, unproblematic entities, nor is municipal ownership a
re-determinant of energy transition. It was however clear that
heir ability to appropriate value from energy supply, means that,
epending on the decisions of municipal actors, a proportion of
nergy value can be locally retained and recycled into decarboni-
ation and energy transition, the ﬁscal stability of the local state,
nd/or cross subsidise other local services.
.2.4. The role of ﬁnancial institutions
The expansion of citizen, municipal and co-operative stakes in
he German energy sector has been enabled by ﬁnancial institu-
ions that incorporate three traits unfamiliar in the UK’s centralised
ector: local subsidiarity, common public beneﬁt values and pro-
otional lending. There is an established local banking sector in
ermany, in which the scales of loans are more compatible with
istributed energy schemes. The two main institutions in this sec-
or are the Savings Banks Group (Sparkassen and Landesbank)
nd the co-operative banks (Volks and Raiffeisen Banks). The sav-cial Science 12 (2016) 5–15 11
ings banks and co-operative banks are not small players—in 2014,
they comprised 62% of all small business loans, almost 100% of
loans to tradespeople, 50% of consumer credit, 42% of loans to
municipalities and 60% of mortgages [106]. However, each regional
bank is a separate business under the institutional form of a sav-
ings/mutual bank. Where the UK has 162 banks, Germany has over
1600 [107]; though much like the stadtwerke, not all customers
can access all savings/co-operative banks, as they are territorially
bound:
“The difference between a savings bank and other lenders is that
the savings bank will not withdraw [. . .]  it is anchored within
that local area and also bound to only operate in that local area,
will have to live off the proﬁts that it can make in that local
area. [. . .]  So each and every savings bank can adapt its actual
business to the condition it ﬁnds in the local area; and that is
very important. That is this decentralised model.”
(Savings Bank Executive, 2014)
“. . .the local co-operative banks, they are rooted or backed in
the regions [. . .]  In Germany we have a little bit less than 1100
Volksbank and Raiffeisen banks [. . .]  we  don’t want to have such
big units that we are not near enough to the customers and
therefore we  are still quite a lot of Volksbank and Raiffeisenbank
so that they are anchored in the regions on a local level.”
(Co-operative Bank Group Employee, 2014)
This decentralised model has been proposed as an additional
ﬁnancial institution for the UK, which would better support
household and SME  lending [108]. The territoriality principal and
proximity to customers and business was  cited several times by
interviewees as an enabler, building local knowledge and capacity
for small scale renewables investment. The following shows the
much wider participation a savings bank can have in driving the
decentralised energy economy:
“. . ..  Sparkasse Heidelberg has started ten years ago when they
ﬁrst issues a loan for renewable energy in households and today
they have a very large market share in that in their area but
also a very high number of installations operating solar energy.
And they had to invest of course, they had to invest in skills, in
technicalities, they set up a centre of competence and now it
works and this is proﬁtable both for the people who took the
loans and also for the savings bank”
Savings Bank Group Employee, 2014 [emphasis added]
Whilst there is no special relationship to stadtwerke, as the
majority lender to German public authorities, the savings bank
group is closely invested in municipal as well as citizen energy
schemes (see [109] p. 30–31; and [110]). For the co-operative banks,
the natural channel for energy related investment is through both
direct investment and debt provision to support the equity stakes
of circa 800 energy co-operatives:
“So there’s a close relation between the co-operative banks and
energy co-operatives on the regional or local level. So a lot of
new renewable energy co-operatives were founded or were
supported by co-operative banks. So they supported business
plans so they built the right stuff”
(Co-operative Bank Group Employee, [emphasis added] 2014)
Both the savings and co-operative bank groups are key institu-
tional promoters and supporters of civil ownership of energy assets,
and they are not passive institutions. They provide developmen-
tal support to civic energy expansion as well as capital. The aims
and objectives of this local banking sector are compatible with the
notions of subsidiarity/self-government, economic stability, envi-
ronmental protection and social welfare expressed by actors across
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he value chain in Germany’s civic energy sector. Because of this,
oth of the local banking institutions of Germany actively promote
ocal ownership and control of the energy sector:
“politically we have a very clear opinion about what we call
re-communalisation. So also in Germany not all the energy sup-
pliers are in municipal hands, there is a strong tendency to
switch that and we support that switch. How do we do that?
First of all we are advocating all kinds of decentralised energy
supply [. . .]  this is really something where civil society, where
communities where municipalities where people from outside
the authorities get together and try to create something and try
to be independent and take some responsibility for their lives
and that is something that is very close to the founding mission
of the savings banks.  . .”
(Savings Bank Group Employee, 2014)
Energy co-operatives are local companies, they pay tax to local
authorities. That’s different to a national or international project
developer who runs a wind farm here in Brandenburg close to
villages and nobody is involved. So the beneﬁts of these projects
remain in the region and that is very important. That’s why a lot
of co-operatives banks support the foundation of these energy
co-operatives.”
(Co-operative Banking Group Employee, 2014)
A key enabler of the growth of this local energy ﬁnance is the
xistence of reﬁnancing loans from the German public develop-
ent bank KfW. KfW utilises its strong credit rating to source
apital market ﬁnance and offers reﬁnancing options for renew-
ble energy and energy efﬁciency loans. Between 2009 and 2013
he savings banks and co-operative banking group accounted for
irca 74% of the D 16.2bn distributed through KfW promotional
nergy lending (Interviewee, 2014) a great majority of this ﬁnance
s for loans under D 25m [111]. This is clearly having substantive
ystemic effects, as can be seen by the more than 33% of German
lectrical capacity being accounted for by <10 MW capacity (Fig. 1).
etween customer deposits and KfW ﬁnance, a strong institutional
ramework for risk shared investment in civic energy is maintained.
In Germany, a dense network of locally rooted banking insti-
utions is able to offer strategic support and renewable energy
oans on favourable terms to small, medium and (utilising regional
artners) sometimes large renewable energy schemes. They do so
ecause renewable energy in Germany is seen as a sound invest-
ent that is compatible with their respective founding principles,
nvestment priorities and governing values.
. The civic energy sector and enabling institutions
Whilst there have been several investigations into speciﬁc ele-
ents of the community, municipal, co-operative, and citizen
nanced energy sectors in both the UK and Germany, this research
rovides a novel investigation of the effects of national ﬁnancial
nstitutions on the proliferation of civic energy. The ﬁndings dis-
ussed above demonstrate the importance of understanding how
nancial institutions enable civic energy participation, alongside
xamining how regulatory institutions such as feed in tariff laws
nd portfolio standards constrain or enable particular actors and
wnership forms.
In the UK case, the three main support mechanisms for renew-
ble energy have been capitalised by ﬁnancial forms created by the
ncumbent, market based institutional system. The complexity of
he Renewables Obligation makes participation from non-specialist
arket entrants difﬁcult, both for civic actors and ﬁnancial institu-
ions more used to working with ﬁxed FiT structures. The move to
iT auctions under EMR was an explicit move to bring in large main-cial Science 12 (2016) 5–15
stream investment capital. One might argue this demonstrated a
strategic selectivity by the state (Jessop [38]) that openly favoured
existing ﬁnancial interests. However, it may  be more accurate to
characterise this as a reaction to institutional path dependence
rather than the interests of capital, in that devoid of bank and utility
capitalisation of renewables, and in a market based ﬁnancial sys-
tem, the only viable alternative in the short term was to seek capital
from actors on ﬁnancial markets. Whist this further structurally dis-
advantages civic energy actors, it is more to do with institutional
path dependence in the ﬁnancial system, than an outright result of
ﬁnancial sector lobbying or incumbent inﬂuence. In parallel, even
the small scale FiT, which is more closely related to the German EEG
law [66], and should be more amenable to civic participation, has
largely been captured by ﬁnancial institutions beyond civil soci-
ety. The ‘ﬁnance gap’ identiﬁed in the UK remains real, due to a set
of institutional conditions that are outside the traditional purview
of energy policy. This landscape of market based ﬁnancial insti-
tutions is structurally unsuited to allocating capital to small scale
renewables. As such it is difﬁcult to see where expanded civic par-
ticipation is going to come from without extending the reach of
energy and other infrastructural policy into the UK institutions of
ﬁnance.
What is important in the German case is the integration between
the bank based ﬁnancial institutions of the German economy and
the civic energy sector. Statutes on public beneﬁt lending enshrined
in savings bank governance and strong shared value frameworks
in the co-operative banking sector meant the EEG law was  intro-
duced into a fertile environment for civic energy participation. This
research identiﬁed a commitment to regional economic stability
and self-governance as important shared values across the civic
energy sector.
The German state’s decision to allow KfW promotional lend-
ing to act as capital reﬁnancing through the institutions of savings
and co-operative banks is a different example of state selectiv-
ity of ﬁnancial institutions in the energy space. This meant that
a dense network of smaller scale institutions allocate capital to
small and medium scale energy schemes through an established
framework of citizen investment and mutual ownership models.
In contrast, the UK’s green investment bank, the only analogous
ﬁnancial institution, has lent almost exclusively to utility scale
generation through corporate actors. Whilst this research has char-
acterised the UK’s civic energy sector as niche, there is evidence
of a revitalisation of civic energy participation led by UK munic-
ipal authorities [112,113]. This is important because the growth
of institutions with compatible values can manifestly be mutually
supportive, and bring new business models and institutional forms
into the energy sector.
6. Conclusions
This paper has investigated the impact of civil society insti-
tutions on the energy sector in the UK and Germany, and their
potential role in the energy system transitions underway in these
countries. Both energy systems co-evolved with the institutions
of ﬁnance capital active in their respective nations. Where the
UK was  found to have a latent but growing civic energy sector,
Germany shows a strong sector with established institutional links
based on shared value frameworks. The civic energy sector in
Germany incorporates municipal institutions, co-operatives, and
citizen investment and re-communalisation groups. These actors
are not always harmonious, yet they do form a substantive part of
the energy system that are subject to different dynamics than state
or corporate institutions.
Clearly these are broad characterisations and mask some impor-
tant conﬂicts and nuances within a complex environment both
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n Germany and the UK. Civic actors and compatible ﬁnancial
nstitutions exist in the UK (though in speciﬁc niches) and commer-
ial bank lending and insurance fund participation are established
eatures of the German renewables market. Equally, whilst the
nvolvement of private equity in stadtwerke has ﬂuctuated, munic-
pals and Lander often have signiﬁcant holdings in private utilities.
owever, this research has clearly identiﬁed the importance of the
acro-economic context of ﬁnancial institutions for the emergence
f local energy ownership structures, with ﬁnancial institutions
s active enablers in energy transitions, which shape the owner-
hip structures and technology choices of the energy transitions of
ifferent nations.
This research has implications for the realisation of a low carbon
nergy transition in these and other countries. The UK and Germany
ie towards opposite ends of the spectrum of liberalised market to
o-ordination economies, and their market-based vs bank-based
nancial institutions reﬂect this. The forms of low carbon transition
urrently being pursued reﬂect this institutional path dependence,
ith the UK government framing the transition in terms of state
reation of ‘competitive markets’, compared to a more inclusive
Energiewende’ in Germany. This suggests that, if the UK and other
arket based economies want to encourage the development of a
ivic energy sector, they would need to do more to develop appro-
riate ﬁnancial institutions, such as more locally oriented banks, to
upport this. This is important in terms of realising the potential of
he civic energy sector to contribute to a transition in these coun-
ries, and also in terms of the extent to which beneﬁts from these
nvestments are able to be retained within these localities.
There is a clear need for further analysis of ﬁnancial institu-
ions as important enablers in energy transitions. Further research
ould beneﬁt from focussed quantitative analysis of the volumes
nd types of lending to civic energy groups. Further analysis of how
arket based vs bank based economies capitalise energy transi-
ions would shed light on the links between energy policies and
ational varieties of capitalism. Finally, an investigation of the ﬁnal
osts different ﬁnancial institutional landscapes impose on energy
ransitions would demonstrate which forms of sector capitalisation
an achieve energy transitions both within credible cost frame-
orks and with the requisite public support.
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